

The Institutional Subcommittee submitted the following proposals during Subcommittee and Open Committee Meetings in support of the National Commission on the Future of the Army

1. **Issue:** Identification of the Distribution of Responsibility and Authority for the Allocation of Army National Guard Personnel and Force Structure. Presented to the Open Commission 18 August 2015.
  - **Summary:** Section 1703(a)(2)(c) of the FY15 NDAA requires the Commission to identify and evaluate the distribution of responsibility and authority for the allocation of Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel and force structure. The NCFA staff researched relevant law and policy in order to identify how responsibility and authority are distributed between the legislative and executive branches of the federal government, within the executive branch, and between federal and state governments.
  - **Position/Perspective:** Based on our research there are several minor issues that could be addressed. The regulations concerning the allocation of ARNG personnel and force structure are complicated and should be clarified by the Department of the Army. For example, older Army regulations delegate authority to the Director, Army National Guard, but the more recent applicable regulations correctly delegate authority to the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Ideally, there should be a written delegation of authority from the Chief, National Guard Bureau to the Director, Army National Guard; however, we have been unable to verify whether such a written delegation exists. Finally, the NGB may want to consider whether to require a state governor's approval in circumstances beyond what is required by statute. While it would always be preferable to have a state government's approval, it is not legally required in all the circumstances mentioned in NGR 10-1.
2. **Issue:** Fully Burdened Life Cycle Cost. Presented to the Open Commission 18 August 2015.
  - **Summary:** The NDAA 15 language reflects the term "Fully Burdened Life Cycle Costs" under considerations for the commission. The Reserve Forces Policy Board introduced the term in their reporting. The NCFA staff conducted research in industry, academia, and within DoD for "Fully Burdened Life Cycle Cost" to assess validity of use for of the commission's costing activities.
  - **Position/Perspective:** Activity Based Costing is a method of estimating cost by determining a current per capita (per person, per mile, etc.) cost and applying that cost to a future population or level of activity. "Fully Burdened Lifecycle Cost" is not an established, repeatable methodology and therefore, not a useful tool for the commission in budgeting or cost estimating. Activity Based Costing provides an explainable and repeatable method for projecting and estimating future costs.

- **Proposal:** The Institutional subcommittee proposes the commission follow the Activity Based Costing process.
3. **Issue:** Integrated Personnel & Pay System-Army (IPPS-A). Presented to the Open Commission 18 August 2015.
- **Summary:** The IPPS-A is a web-based Human Resources (HR) system that will provide integrated, multi-component, personnel and pay capabilities across the Army. IPPS-A will create an integrated personnel and pay record for each Soldier that covers their entire career, allows personnel actions to drive associated pay events, and features self-service capabilities allowing Soldiers to access their personal information 24 hours a day. IPPS-A will also facilitate the movement of Soldiers between Army components by maintaining benefits, personnel information and training in accordance with the Army Total Force Policy.
  - **Proposal:** The Institutional subcommittee proposes the commission support the fielding of IPPS-A on the current schedule and caution Army leadership against pushing for faster fielding over accuracy and completeness of a given software increment. Additionally, the Institutional subcommittee proposes the commission request that Congress fully fund IPSS-A in FY16 and beyond to maintain the program's schedule.
4. **Issue:** Process for Allocating Army National Guard Personnel and Force Structure. Presented to the Open Commission 18 August 2015.
- **Summary:** The National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2015 directed the National Commission on the Future of the Army to consider an identification and evaluation of the strategic basis or rationale, analytical methods, and decision-making processes for the allocation of the Army National Guard (ARNG) personnel and force structure to the States and territories. The Institutional Subcommittee has identified and evaluated these items.
  - **Position/Perspective:** The subcommittee found that allocation of personnel and force structure to the States and territories is accomplished within the Army's Total Army Analysis (TAA) process managed by the Army G-3/5/7. Within that process, Army G-3/5/7 informs the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB) of the overall personnel and force structure changes to be applied to the ARNG. Additionally, the subcommittee found that the allocation processes used by the NGB begins by using objective, quantified metrics, which were vetted through the States and territories.
  - **Proposals:**
    - i. Codify the delegation of authority from the Chief, National Guard Bureau to the Director, Army National Guard in Army regulations.

- ii. Codify the existing Army National Guard Force Program Review process as the formal way to manage change in the Army National Guard. Document the process in Army regulations.
  - iii. Add representatives for Force Program Review working groups and boards as observers from the office of the Secretary of the Army and from Headquarters, Department of the Army, G3 to support the Army National Guard Force Program Review process.
- 5. **Issue:** Legislative and policy proposals to achieve One Army Recruiting. Presented to the Open Commission 15 December 2015.
  - **Summary:** Provide the institutional sub-committee of the National Commission on the Future of the Army with potential policy and legislative proposals related to recruiting and marketing. The proposals include measures that the Secretary of the Army may approve under current authorities and legislative proposals that require congressional action.
  - **Proposals:**
    - i. Congress should authorize the Secretary of the Army to consolidate the marketing function for all three components under the authority of the AMRG, while requiring that marketing resources are properly allocated to achieve the recruiting goals for all three components.
    - ii. The Secretary of the Army should reauthorize the Active First Program. This program operated between 2007 and 2011 and over 4900 individuals assessed into the Army through the program. Through this program, ARNG recruiters offered Active Duty contracts to individuals who then agreed to a Selected Reserve tour in the ARNG (unless they elected to re-enlist in the Regular Army).
    - iii. Congress should authorize and direct the Secretary of the Army to establish a significant pilot program in which recruiters from all three components would be authorized to recruit individuals into any of the components and would receive credit for an enlistee regardless of the component. Congress should specifically authorize this "notwithstanding any other laws" in order to avoid potential fiscal law concerns. The purpose of the pilot program would be to study whether there are efficiencies to be gained by eliminating competition among recruiters. The pilot program should last long enough for the Army to be able to effectively implement the statutory and policy changes and evaluate their impact on recruiting. We propose a multi-year pilot program with reports to congress at the midpoint and at the end of the pilot. The reports should provide congress with the results of the pilot and

recommendations as to whether to make the temporary authorities permanent.

6. **Issue:** Unity of Effort in Training and Soldier Development. Presented to the Open Commission 15 December 2015.

- **Summary:** The Army is reliant upon itself to develop leaders. To accomplish this, the Army manages an extensive system of schools and centers that provide education and training to Soldiers in the Active Component (AC), the Reserve Components (RC), and to Army Civilians. Failure to develop leaders prevents the ability to build quality units, design campaigns, or perform effective operations. Leader development is the deliberate, continuous, and progressive process that grows Soldiers and Army Civilians into competent, committed professional leaders. Leader development is attained through the combination of training, education, and experiences acquired through opportunities in the operational, institutional, and self-development domains, supported by peer and developmental relationships.
- **Proposals:**
  - i. Conduct an end-to-end review of The Army School System....The Secretary of the Army shall report to (XX Congressional Subcommittee) on efficiencies gained by consolidating capabilities and capacity. There are numerous documents that purport a strategy and regulations that explain leader development but the two, in some cases, do not match. Take a holistic look at current strategy, link it to doctrine, and reduce publications as much as possible to minimize confusion. Additionally, name the Army's school system what it is - The Army School System
  - ii. Establish true regionalization of the Army's school system. Continue to consolidate the infrastructure where efficiencies can be gained. Acknowledge and explain any unused capacity and develop a plan to retain or eliminate it. Plan for the ability to regenerate and expand the Army if needed. Continuous oversight by Army leaders will ensure the correct balance of infrastructure and capacity to meet the Nation's needs.
  - iii. Accelerate the One Army School System concept. Capitalize on the progress made as an efficient and effective way to manage leader development within the Army.
  - iv. Standardize all Army Program(s) of Instruction (POI). Additional efficiencies can be gained by ensuring all POIs meet the same standard critical tasks training requirements. Identify all gaps in course length and discrepancies in equipment fielding.
  - v. Conduct a comprehensive review of all courses the Army teaches. As part of the review, consider eliminating phased Professional Military Education

(PME) courses that last longer than two years and where possible, reduce phased courses to a maximum of one year. Also, make recommendations on courses the Army believes should not be taught in phases.

7. **Issue:** Trainee, Transient, Holdee, Student personnel readiness like account for Reserve Components. Presented to the Open Commission 15 December 2015.
  - **Summary:** The Regular Army is authorized a higher personnel end strength than the total number of positions in the actual force structure. Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) are managed in the TTHS account. This account allows Operating Force units to be filled with fully trained and ready Soldiers, thus maximizing unit readiness. Soldiers in the TTHS account are managed outside of Operating Force units and Generating Force units. The Army also added to Regular Army end strength during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom under both War Time Allowance (WTA) and Temporary End Strength Increase (TESI) that authorized more personnel and funded the increases using Overseas Contingency Operations funds. The Army's successful use of TTHS, WTA, and TESI for Regular Army units indicates similar approaches for ARNG and USAR could work during times of crisis. While similar reserve component accounts requiring an increase in end strength or reduction in force structure while retaining end strength is not desirable at this time, under certain situations such accounts would allow greater flexibility in for managing readiness in reserve component units.
  - **Finding:** The Regular Army successfully used TTHS, WTA, and TESI during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom to provide additional end strength for flexibility in managing readiness.
  - **Proposal:** The Congress should be prepared to authorize and fund additional end strength for the Reserve Components using supplemental funding upon the Declaration of a National Emergency under Title 50, United States Code to achieve anticipated readiness goals.
8. **Issue:** Merge the Active Guard and Reserve Program into the Regular Army. Presented to the Open Commission 18 November 2015.
  - **Position/Perspective:** Achieving Total Force Policy ideals has been challenging. The challenges to developing a "One Army," culture are both cultural and legal. The Commission believes a key aspect to achieving integration of the components is providing officers and enlisted Soldiers opportunities to serve in other components. There currently are statutory limits to such integration. Statute does not permit the assignment of Regular Army Officers and Enlisted Soldiers into Army National Guard positions to execute Full-Time Support functions. Currently Regular Army personnel

are limited to detailing to serve with Army National Guard units with limited authorities.

- **PROPOSALS:** The Commission believes the Congress should enact legislation to allow assignment of Regular Army Officers and Enlisted Soldiers to Army National Guard positions to execute all functions without prejudice to their Federal standing. The legislation should also permit the similar assignment of National Guard Officers and Enlisted Soldiers to Regular Army units. Assignment to another component should be considered a key developmental experience and could be considered criteria for promotion. Additionally, the Commission recommends the Army launch a Pilot Program (Option 1 or 2) to assess the merits of assigning Regular Army members to States and USAR Commands.
  - i. Bold Shift II Pilot Program Option 1. Fill 50% of a State AGR and 50% of a USAR Functional Command's AGR requirements with Regular Army Personnel and provide professional development tours for displaced AGRs for a period of three years to be followed by a General Accounting Office (GAO) Assessment of the pilot program.
  - ii. Bold Shift II Pilot Program Option 2. Fill 25% of a State AGR and 25% of a USAR Functional Command's AGR requirements with Regular Army Personnel and provide professional development tours for displaced AGRs for a period of three years to be followed by a GAO for an assessment of the pilot program.

9. **Issue:** Generating Force Floor. Presented to the Open Commission 18 November 2015

- **Position/Perspective:** The portion of the Department of the Army that fulfills the Secretary's responsibilities is referred to as the generating force. Through the execution of these statutory functions a portion of the Army generates the operational Companies, Battalions, Brigades, Divisions, and Corps that most are familiar with. The Army is divided into two functionally discrete but organizationally integrated entities. These are known as the operational Army and the generating force. The operational Army consists primarily of units whose primary purpose is to conduct or support full spectrum operations. The generating force is that part of the Army whose primary purpose is generating and sustaining operational Army units by performing functions specified and implied by law. As a consequence of performing those functions, the generating force also has capabilities that are useful in supporting operations in the current operational environment. Generating force support for full spectrum operations falls into three broad categories; adapting to the operational environment, enabling strategic reach, and developing multinational partner capability and capacity. The generating force's primary mission—generating and sustaining the operational Army - determines its overall capabilities and capacity. It performs functions specified in law including designing, organizing, recruiting, training, equipping, modernizing, deploying and sustaining, to ensure

readiness and availability of all Army forces. Generating Force missions are the primary means by which the Operational Army's capabilities for employment by Joint Force commanders are generated and sustained. Counterintuitively the size of the Operating Force is not the primary driver of the size of the Generating Force. Many of the Generating Force functions are required regardless of the size of the Army; the size of the operating force only informs the scale of the generating force. The twelve Secretary of the Army responsibilities are required irrespective of the size of the operating force. Whether there are five or fifty divisions in the Army they still must be recruited, equipped, supplied, administered, maintained and have an installation. In fact reducing the size of the Operating Force will only have a marginal impact on the size of the Generating Force. The Army approach to reducing resources by distributing the reductions equally across functions or targeting the generating force for reduction without addressing the enduring necessity performing the functions in the generating force increase risk as the Army decreases in size.

- **Proposal:** The Army should complete development and fully implement the Center for Army Analysis and U.S. Army Manpower Analysis Agency Generating Force Model to improve requirements determination. The model will have the ability to project Generating Force manpower requirements into the out-years and provide the leadership options to redistribute manpower externally, realign manpower internally, or divest the function.